The Coevolution of Banks and Corporate Securities Markets: The Financing
  of Belgium's Industrial Take-Off in the 1830s by Ugolini, Stefano
 1 
 
 
The Coevolution of Banks and Corporate Securities Markets: 
The Financing of Belgium’s Industrial Take-Off in the 1830s 
 
 
 
Stefano Ugolini
1
 
Sciences Po Toulouse and LEREPS, University of Toulouse, Toulouse, France 
 
  
                                                 
1
 Email: stefano.ugolini@ut-capitole.fr. I am grateful to Michelangelo Vasta and two anonymous referees for 
their great help in improving this article. I thank Olivier Accominotti, Vincent Bignon, Youssef Cassis, Abe de 
Jong, Marc Flandreau, Juan H. Flores, Timothy Guinnane, Lars Norden, Mary O’Sullivan, and Herman Van der 
Wee for discussing some of the issues raised here. I am also indebted to Frans Buelens for providing access to 
some data series from the SCOB database. An early version of this article was circulated under the title: 
“Universal Banking and the Development of Secondary Corporate Debt Markets: Lessons from 1830s Belgium”. 
The usual disclaimers apply. 
 2 
 
 
 
Abstract: Recent developments in the literature on financial architecture suggest that banks 
and markets not only coexist, but also coevolve in ways that are non-neutral from the 
viewpoint of optimality. This article aims to analyse the concrete mechanisms of this 
coevolution by focusing on a very relevant case study: Belgium (the first Continental country 
to industrialize) at the time of the very first emergence of a modern financial system (the 
1830s). The article shows that intermediaries played a crucial role in developing secondary 
securities markets (as banks acted as securitizers), but market conditions also had a strong 
feedback on banks’ balance sheets and activities (as banks also acted as market-makers for 
the securities they had issued). The findings suggest that not only structural, but also cyclical 
factors can be important determinants of changes in financial architecture. 
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Section 1: Introduction 
 
Since the foundational contributions of Gurley and Shaw (1955), Gerschenkron (1962), 
and Goldsmith (1969), a massive body of research has been consecrated to the understanding 
of financial architecture, and the pros and cons of allegedly market- or bank-based financial 
systems have been thoroughly investigated. Starting from the late 1990s, the relevance of the 
traditional ‘banks vs. markets’ dichotomy has been questioned theoretically (Allen & Gale, 
2000), empirically (Levine, 2005), as well as historically (Fohlin, 2012). A new consensus 
appears to have emerged on the fact that banks and markets should no longer be seen as 
substitutes, but rather as complements (Boot & Thakor, 2010). As a result, the question of the 
interaction between banks and markets has started to raise increasing interest. While the 
earlier literature had considered the evolution of banks and markets as a ‘zero-sum game’ in 
which the ones only grow at the expense of the others and vice-versa (Da Rin, 1997; 
Greenwood & Smith, 1997; Boot & Thakor, 1997; Boyd & Smith, 1998; Baliga & Polak, 
2004; Chakraborty & Ray, 2007), more recent contributions have underlined that this need not 
be the case (Allen & Gale, 2000; Deidda & Fattouh, 2008; Mattana & Panetti, 2014). Their 
conclusion is that banks and market not only coexist, but also coevolve in ways that are non-
neutral in terms of welfare. Banks perform three fundamental functions (screening, qualitative 
asset transformation, and credit enhancement) whose implementation allows for the 
development of financial markets; securitization puts in motion a virtuous cycle that is 
beneficial for the real economy, as it increases the efficiency of capital allocation (Song & 
Thakor, 2010). 
Although economic historians have been paying increasing attention to the coexistence of 
banks and markets, the concrete mechanisms through which banks and markets coevolved in 
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the past have not been specifically investigated to date. This article aims at filling this gap by 
studying the synchronous emergence of new intermediaries (universal banks) and new 
markets (secondary corporate stock markets) at the very time of the industrial take-off of a 
‘moderately backward’ country (Belgium in the 1830s). The idea is to understand what 
factors drove the spectacular changes in financial architecture that allowed for the financing 
of growth in that national economic system, which was the first to follow Britain on the path 
to industrialization. As 1830s Belgium was the context in which universal banks first 
appeared at all, this article is also de facto a study of the very origins of universal banking. 
The remainder is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the historical literature on 
financial architecture. Section 3 surveys available historical evidence on Belgium and 
presents my original database. Section 4 focuses on the impact of banks’ actions on market 
evolution. It underscores the role of Belgian banks in fostering the emergence of the Brussels 
stock market through their securitization of corporate assets. Section 5 focuses on the impact 
of market conditions on bank evolution. It shows that securitization did not mean a total 
dismissal of such assets by banks: banks actually had to continue intervening on the stock 
market well beyond the underwriting process, and securities originated by them tended to 
reappear on their balance sheets in times of crisis. Finally, Section 6 draws some general 
conclusions on the determinants of banks’ and markets’ coevolution. 
 
 
Section 2: Literature Review 
 
The historical literature on financial architecture has long been dominated by an 
“institutional” approach (Fohlin, 2016). On the one hand, Gerschenkron’s (1962) highly 
influential contribution encouraged generations of historians to focus on the role of banks as 
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drivers of industrialization in moderately-backward countries. On the other hand, 
Goldmsmith’s (1969) criticism of Gerschenkron led other historians to insist on the 
contribution of markets to the financing of economic growth. Both strands of the historical 
literature thus tended to take a (more or less strict) dicothomical view on the subject: financial 
systems were generally categorized as being either bank- or market-based. Yet, as argued by 
Fohlin (2016), the traditional “institutional” approach tends to obstruct a proper understanding 
of how financial systems actually worked, and should be replaced by a “functional” one. 
Focusing ex post on the provision of financial functions (rather than on the action of some 
specific organizations whose characteristics are defined ex ante) actually allows to by-pass the 
sterile controversies on the preeminence of banks or markets that have long dominated the 
historical literature.
2
 In a series of contributions, Fohlin (2007, 2012, 2016) showed 
convincingly that financial architecture at the time of industrialization was far from being 
clearly bank- or market-based in any major country. 
If recent contributions have substantially improved our understanding of how financial 
systems were structured at the time of industrialization, the very mechanisms through which 
such structures actually emerged and evolved over time still remain to be clarified. For 
instance, the best available synthesis of recent scholarship (Fohlin, 2012) adopts a cross-
sectional rather than a truly chronological view on the subject. Even more detailed single-
country studies (esp. Fohlin, 2007) are rather descriptive in nature and do not really ask why 
the provision of financial functions was actually organized the way it was. Yet, anecdotal 
evidence on the emergence of modern financial systems at the time of industrial take-off is 
actually available. In particular, three cases have attracted more scholarly attention: Germany, 
Austria, and Italy – the three countries that were identified by Gerschenkron (1962, p. 14) as 
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paradigms of ‘moderately backward’ countries having adopted universal banking as a 
‘facilitator’ of industrialization. 
Germany has naturally attracted much scholarly attention, but most of the focus has been 
on the mature stages of the financial system after the 1870s rather than on its infancy in the 
1850s (see e.g. Gerschenkron, 1962; Fohlin, 2007). Available studies of the earlier phase of 
financial development (see e.g. Riesser, 1911; Tilly, 1966) have nonetheless shown that early 
German joint-stock banks’ main business consisted of the floatation of ‘innovative’ 
companies on previously inexistent secondary corporate securities market. 
Austria has also been mostly studied in the more mature stages of financial development 
since the 1890s rather than in the early times preceding the Gründerkrach of 1873 (see e.g. 
Gerschenkron, 1977; Good, 1991). Recent studies of this ‘formative’ crisis have however 
revealed the overwhelming involvement of early Austrian joint-stock banks into the 
underwriting of ‘innovative’ equities and into the related repo market, suggesting that banks 
were a driving force of the emergence of a stock market (Rieder, 2017). 
In the case of Italy, the formative years of the modern financial system (the 1890s) have 
actually been covered by most of the literature (see e.g. Federico and Toniolo, 1991; Fohlin, 
2012). These studies have consistently pointed to the same results found for 1850s Germany 
or 1870s Austria: in 1890s Italy, banks were largely concerned with the floatation of 
‘innovative’ equities on the new stock exchange and provided liquidity to the latter through 
the repo market (Confalonieri, 1974-6; Brambilla, 2010). 
Thus, available evidence on the very origins of financial architecture seems to suggest 
that early universal banks were heavily involved in the securitization of ‘innovative’ assets 
and played a crucial role in developing corporate securities markets. In what follows, this 
point will be thoroughly investigated through a case study on Belgium. Perhaps because of 
Gerschenkron’s original oversight, this country has attracted comparatively little international 
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attention. This lack of interest is unwarranted: Belgium was actually the first Continental 
country to experience, already in the 1830s, both an industrial take-off and the emergence of a 
modern financial system. More than that, 1830s Belgium was the place and time in which 
universal banking first emerged at all (Chlepner, 1943). The intermediaries that appeared in 
this context were very similar to the ‘prototypical’ universal bank: they extensively 
underwrote strictly industrial securities and collected deposits from the public (Ugolini, 
2011). As Sylla (1991, p. 54) put it, ‘Gerschenkron chose Germany as his example of a 
moderately backward country that employed dynamic banking to industrialize. He might 
better have chosen Belgium’. 
 
 
Section 3: Background and Data 
 
At the beginning of the 19
th
 century, the financial capital of the Belgian region was still 
located in Antwerp. The seat of Belgium’s rich aristocracy, Brussels just hosted a number of 
tradesmen and a few bankers specialized in wealth management (Ugolini, 2011). Yet when in 
1822 William I of the Netherlands decided to found a chartered bank of issue (acting as 
Treasury’s agent) in the Southern part of his Kingdom, he chose to locate it in Brussels. 
Officially established to provide credit to infant industries (as suggested by its name: Société 
Générale pour favoriser l’industrie nationale, i.e. ‘Financial Company for the Aid of the 
National Industry’), the bank was also intended for facilitating government borrowing in the 
South. The charter provided no restrictions on the financial operations the bank could 
implement, making it very different from the typical early-19
th
-century bank of issue 
(Demoulin, 1938, pp. 49-70). 
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Société Générale (hereafter SG) was supposed to be a purely private joint-stock company, 
but its stock capital was mostly provided by the King himself, who swapped a vast real-estate 
endowment (Crown forestlands) for equity. The rest was intended for sale to the public, but 
the rights issue failed, and William I found himself with a larger stake than planned (83%). 
The largest part of the remaining capital (a mere 9% of the total) was held by a group of 
Brussels notables (landowners, retailers, and private bankers), from whom the members of the 
board came (Brion & Moreau, 1998, pp. 23-24). In 1830, the directors of SG took advantage 
of the opportunity offered by the Belgian revolt: the King’s stake was frozen, and Crown 
forestlands were seized as private assets of the company. De facto, the bank came to be 
owned by itself. 
During the first decades of the 19
th
 century, Belgium’s industrial potential (tied to the 
presence of coal and iron ore deposits) had become increasingly clear, and a number of 
partnerships had been created with the aim of developing mechanized plants (Briavoinne, 
1839; Mokyr, 1976). The new firms, however, were faced with the typical difficulties inherent 
with infant ‘high-tech’ sectors: high growth potential was actually counterbalanced by large 
uncertainty and by the volatility of revenues, thus discouraging lenders from providing credit 
(Lévy-Leboyer, 1964; Cameron, 1967). In the 1820s, credit rationing had been partially 
alleviated by direct state aid and government-sponsored lending by SG (Demoulin, 1938), but 
the 1830 revolt led to a ‘sudden stop’. The crisis had two important consequences for the 
newborn country’s financial system. First, municipal savings banks, which were heavily 
invested in Dutch public debt, went bankrupt, and SG was called to the rescue by absorbing 
them: as a result, the bank assumed large deposit-taking activities (Ugolini, 2011). Second, 
growth perspectives were jeopardized, and many infant industries slid into insolvency. Facing 
difficulties in recovering industrial credits, since late 1834 SG started to negotiate their 
conversion into equity. Industrial partnerships were thus transformed into joint-stock 
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companies and then floated on the stock market, although the bank kept a stake in them. As 
argued by Briavoinne (1839, p. 230), the bank ventured into incorporation with the aim of 
mobilizing its own assets. The incorporation wave had started, and the first prototype of 
universal bank was born. 
In 1834, a conflict burst between SG and the Belgian government, which was willing to 
seize the Dutch Crown’s assets appropriated by the bank. In order to challenge SG’s 
monopoly, in January 1835 a new joint-stock bank, called Banque de Belgique (hereafter 
BdB), was founded. The bank was intended to replace SG as the Treasury’s agent, and 
therefore to become Belgium’s main bank of issue – a step that the government did not 
eventually dare to take. BdB was designed along the model of SG in all details. This was due 
to the fact that, among its founders, there was a group of private bankers eyeing the possibility 
to restructure the underperforming debt of a number of firms to which they found themselves 
directly exposed (Chlepner, 1926, pp. 63-67). As a result, as SG began to float new 
companies on the Brussels stock exchange, BdB followed suit. In the space of a few months, 
their example was imitated by a number of privates unconnected with banks. 
The Belgian incorporation boom came to a sudden stop in December 1838, when an 
exogenous shock (fear of a new war with the Netherlands) triggered bank runs. SG held out, 
while BdB suspended payments and was bailed out by the government. The effects of the 
crisis were long-lasting, as the Brussels stock market did not recover until the 1850s (Ugolini, 
2011). 
In what follows, these ‘formative’ events are analyzed on the basis of an original database 
including all available information on both markets and banks during the 1830s. Table 1 
provides details on the series included in the database, as well as the sources from which they 
are drawn. The analysis of quantitative data performed in the following sections also builds on 
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insights from a rich historical literature, including above all Chlepner’s (1926, 1943) 
contributions, based on an impressive collection of qualitative sources. 
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
 
Section 4: From Banks to Markets 
 
4.1: Banks as Securitizers: Conceptual Framework 
The literature on the industrial organization of corporate finance generally maintains that 
banks are better positioned than markets for overcoming information asymmetries. This is due 
to the existence of economies of scope between lending and the provision of payment 
services, which allows bank to access relevant information on borrowers (Goodfriend, 1991). 
This explains why bank loans are often the only source of external funding available to firms 
at non-prohibitive costs. 
But lending is not banks’ sole corporate finance activity. Innovative start-ups, whose cash 
flows are highly uncertain, may need subsidized lending in their early stages, yet 
intertemporal cross-subsidization is only feasible if the lender-borrower relationship is 
durable (Petersen & Rajan, 1995). Lenders can solve this moral hazard problem by acquiring 
a stake in the borrowing firm and thus getting a say in future decision-making. Banks may 
hence behave as strategic investors in view of the synergies between venture capital 
investment and relationship lending (Hellmann et al., 2008). Debt restructuring may be 
another reason for banks to acquire equity in start-ups. Firms with a higher probability of 
default are more likely to approach banks, because of the latter’s superior ability to minimize 
inefficient liquidations (Chemmanur and Fulghieri, 1994). Banks will be willing to accept a 
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conversion of debt into equity when the market value of their claim on the firm is 
significantly lower than its fundamental value, when the firm’s growth opportunities are high, 
and when indebtedness to other lenders is low (James, 1995). This means that debt-for-equity 
swaps are more likely to occur between banks and start-ups. 
While banks may have good reasons to acquire equity in innovative start-ups, this does 
not mean they will necessarily keep it for long. Equity in unlisted firms is an idiosyncratic and 
illiquid asset. To reduce their exposure to liquidity risk, banks can perform qualitative asset 
transformation and convert it into standardized exchange-traded securities (Loutskina, 2011): 
the bigger the investment, the stronger the incentive to put it off balance sheet (Ghent & 
Valkanov, 2015). Securitizing past investments will allow banks to find new liquid resources 
for seizing new investing opportunities (Vargas-Martínez, 2010). 
Empirical research has found a net certification effect by banks in the securitization 
process. Shares in companies underwritten by banks perform better than others: the effect is 
stronger when the bank keeps a stake in the firm, and is increasing in the size of the stake 
(Puri, 1999). The originator’s continued involvement in the floated company is equivalent to 
an IPO lockup (Brav & Gompers, 2003): as it is supposed to ensure high-quality monitoring, 
it works as a credit enhancement for issued securities (Boot, 2000). 
Three of the literature’s findings are relevant for understanding the role of banks in the 
very early stages of industrialization. First, banks will have a predominant role in the funding 
of innovative start-ups both through lending (because of their privileged access to information 
on borrowers) and through capital venture investing (because of incentives to perform debt-
for-equity swaps). Thus, banks can be expected to become the leading providers of capital to 
innovative firms in view of their superior screening technologies. Second, in order to continue 
profiting from their competitive advantage, banks will need to discharge part of the acquired 
equity by converting it into marketable securities. Thus, banks can be expected to promote the 
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qualitative transformation of innovative corporate assets. Third, banks have a positive 
certification effect for newly-floated corporate securities that is direct proportional to their 
subsequent involvement into the floated company. Thus, banks can be expected to maintain 
corporate control on the floated companies, and this will work as a credit enhancement in the 
eyes of investors. These three hypotheses will now be tested in the context of Belgium’s 
industrial take-off. 
 
4.2: Banks as Securitizers: Evidence from 1830s Belgium 
At the time of Independence, the Belgian provinces possessed neither a developed capital 
market nor a sophisticated banking sector: the bourses of Antwerp and Brussels had thin 
trading activities in a handful of sovereign bonds, while the banking sector only consisted (if 
we exclude SG) of a bunch of small private banks unable to open sizable credit lines to 
industrial firms (Ugolini, 2011). In the 1820s, the earliest attempts at industrialization had 
thus been financed either through internal capital accumulation or through direct state aid 
(Mokyr, 1976). Tellingly, in the more than 250 pages dedicated by his treatise on Belgian 
industrialization to the ‘institutions fostering economic growth’, Natalis Briavoinne referred 
to banks only as providers of means of payments or as underwriters, but not as lenders 
(Briavoinne, 1839). The only exception was SG, but its intervention was seen as yet another 
form of state aid. In the 1820s, SG had been the one significant source of credit available to 
industrial concerns: as the Chamber of Commerce of Mons wrote in 1830, the local branch of 
SG had been “the main, and we can now say it with certitude, in the last analysis the one and 
only foundation” to the development of the coal industry in the region (Demoulin, 1938, p. 
100; Ugolini, 2016). When the 1830 crisis erupted, the bank thus found itself largely exposed 
to defaults in the corporate sector (Houtman-De Smedt, 1997). Table 2 shows that in 1830-1, 
SG was indeed abnormally engaged into short-term lending in the Mons region, in order to 
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meet the pressing demand of the corporate sector (especially coalmines). As soon as it became 
clear that loans would be unrecoverable, the bank started to negotiate debt-for-equity swaps 
with defaulting firms. The Mons region would thus become the heartland of SG’s industrial 
empire (Brion & Moreau, 1998). Yet debt restructuring was not the main way in which banks 
took stakes in innovative firms. More typically, entrepreneurs approached their bank to ask 
funds for the modernization of their private partnership, and negotiations took place: then the 
firm was incorporated, a portion of the stock reserved for the entrepreneur, and the rest 
underwritten by the bank (Chlepner, 1943). 
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
Following 1831, Belgium experienced a boom of incorporations. Under the aegis of the 
Napoleonic Code de Commerce (still in force in the country), three corporate forms were 
available at the time: 1) société en nom collectif (ordinary partnership with unlimited liability 
of all partners), 2) société en commandite (special partnership with unlimited liability of 
active partners and limited liability of silent partners), and 3) société anonyme (joint-stock 
company with limited liability of all shareholders). Because it provided an almost unchecked 
power to active partners and thus opened scope for abuses, société en commandite soon 
became a very unpopular corporate form. Société anonyme was considered as granting better 
protection to shareholders, but its creation had to be approved by decree, making it a hardly 
accessible corporate form for most industries (Freedeman 1965). The text of the new 
Constitution of 1831, however, opened a juridical loophole with non-negligible consequences 
for the corporate sector. The establishment of ‘unlimited freedom of association’ as a 
constitutional right was actually interpreted by many as an abolition of the requirement of 
government approval to the incorporation of sociétés anonymes. The result was an unchecked 
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boom of creations of joint-stock companies (Chlepner, 1926). Figure 1 shows that the peak of 
the phenomenon took place between 1835 and 1838. As illustrated by table 3, almost two 
thirds of the total amount of capital raised went to three specific sectors: financials, 
coalmines, and ironworks. The role played by banks is highlighted by table 4: SG and BdB 
contributed to the incorporation of 37% of the companies created, and these very companies 
absorbed more than 60% of the total amount of capital raised. This means that banks acted as 
venture capital investors for more capital-intensive firms, whose growth prospects and cash 
flow volatility were highest at the time. On the whole, available evidence appears to be 
consistent with the first hypothesis: at the time of Belgium’s industrial take-off, the provision 
of capital to innovative firms was actually dominated by banks. 
 
[Figure 1 and Tables 3 and 4 about here] 
 
Given the dearth of data concerning the Belgian capital market during the 1830s, the only 
available proxy for the width of this market consists of the number of securities exchanged at 
the bourse.
3
 Table 5 describes the population of securities traded in Brussels by asset class. It 
shows that a Belgian stock market only emerged in 1835 (when universal banks entered the 
underwriting business), and continued to be dominated by banks throughout the period 
(always more than 80% of the total listed equities concerned bank-affiliated firms). The fact 
that a large number of incorporated firms did not have their stock traded at the Brussels 
bourse, however, is not imputable to the existence of entry barriers to outsiders (Chlepner, 
1926). This suggests that the shares of non-affiliated companies, which tended to be less 
capital-intensive (see table 5), only circulated in restricted local circles (where information 
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(which covered the securities actually traded on the market) to the lists provided by official bulletins (which 
covered all securities listed regardless of their actual liquidity). He also takes into account the other relevant 
Belgian capital market (i.e. the Antwerp bourse), to conclude that the flotation of industrial equity was a purely 
Brussels-based phenomenon. 
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asymmetries could be lowered by personal connections: Lamoreaux, 1996), and lacked access 
to the official bourse. Thus, universal banks acted as gatekeepers of the general capital 
market. The non-existence of a market for corporate bonds corroborates this conclusion, as 
banks never underwrote such securities. This appears to confirm the second hypothesis – viz., 
that banks dominated the process of qualitative transformation of corporate assets into 
exchange-traded securities. 
 
[Table 5 about here] 
 
According to the Code de Commerce, the names of the directors of new joint-stock 
companies had to be explicitly mentioned in the charter: the board typically included the 
promoters of the enterprise and was ratified by the shareholders’ general assembly only well 
after the floatation (Freedeman, 1965). This arrangement allowed venture capital investors to 
keep their grip on the firm well beyond the incorporation process. Using information from the 
charters of floated companies, Table 6 shows that the directors of SG and BdB were 
systematically advertised as ‘leading administrators’ of the firms incorporated by the two 
banks. The governor of BdB, Charles de Brouckère, was indicated as ‘leading administrator’ 
of 13 companies underwritten by his bank, with a cumulative capital of more than 55 million 
francs; while the governor of SG, Ferdinand de Meeus, was either directly or indirectly (as a 
‘leading administrator’ of the two subsidiaries Société de Commerce and Société Nationale) 
chairing no less than 24 companies underwritten by his bank, with a cumulative capital of 
more than 92 million francs. In the end, the boards of all bank-affiliated companies were 
constantly occupied by the directors of the two underwriters (Laureyssens, 1975; Kurgan-Van 
Hentenryk, 1996). Exacerbated by extensive crossholding of affiliates through other affiliates, 
the phenomenon of board interlocks proved persistent feature in Belgium (Van Overfelt et al., 
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2009). The fact that banks’ corporate control on affiliated firms remained strongest is 
consistent with the idea of a lockup effect on underwritten companies. Banks’ persistent 
involvement into the management of floated companies acted as a sort of moral guarantee in 
the eyes of investors, as it suggested that underwritten firms would be closely monitored and 
granted constant liquidity assistance by banks. On the whole, this seems to confirm the third 
hypothesis – viz., that banks boosted the attractiveness of floated securities by providing them 
with some form of credit enhancement. 
 
[Table 6 about here] 
 
 
Section 5: From Markets to Banks 
 
5.1: Banks as Market Makers: Conceptual Framework 
According to the finance literature, markets provide two crucial functions: price 
discovery and liquidity. The two are inextricably linked, although they do not actually 
coincide. On the one hand, price discovery is the mechanism allowing for the incorporation of 
all available information into asset prices: its efficiency is hindered by the presence of 
information asymmetries, as uninformed traders bear a non-diversifiable risk of losses when 
they trade against informed ones. On the other hand, liquidity is the mechanism allowing for 
the matching of buyers and sellers of assets: its efficiency is hindered by the presence of 
transaction costs (O’Hara, 2003). 
Price discovery is a particularly delicate process at the time of the first introduction of an 
asset into the market. In theory, even if the amount of information available to the whole of 
market participants is superior to the one available to the underwriter alone, the latter’s 
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pricing errors should be randomly distributed – meaning that the difference between the issue 
price and the market price of the floated asset should be zero on average. In real-world 
markets, however, underpricing is almost constantly observed – meaning that the market 
price almost always exceeds the issue price. Price run-ups have been generally interpreted as 
unbiased indicators of information asymmetries – i.e., as the ‘lemons premium’ that issuers 
are obliged to pay in order for uninformed investors to be attracted (Rock, 1986). However, 
some contributions have pointed to the existence of widespread aftermarket intervention by 
underwriters – be it direct (such as price support) or indirect (such as sentiment creation) – 
which exacerbates price run-ups (Welch, 1992; Ellis et al., 2000; Derrien, 2005; Ritter, 2011). 
Two (not mutually exclusive) explanations for aftermarket intervention have been 
advanced. The first (more pessimistic) one is that securitization is, by far, the main source of 
profit for venture capitalists (Lerner, 1994). If the same intermediary is both venture capitalist 
and underwriter of the floated firm, conflicts of interests will naturally arise in view of the 
obvious incentive to maximize price run-ups, and this may be conducive to cronyism 
(Drucker & Puri, 2007; Ritter, 2011). The second (more optimistic) explanation is linked to 
the sunk-cost nature of reputation. Success in the underwriting business critically depends on 
the underwriter’s reputation as a certifier (Ljungqvist, 2007). In case the case of an IPO 
lockup, the underwriters’ need to enhance the performance of the floated securities will not 
only apply in the short run, but also in the long run. In order to prevent bad signals from being 
conveyed to the market, underwriting banks will be ready to provide subsidized lending to an 
underperforming affiliated firm (Kanodia et al., 1989). Therefore, in order to maintain its 
reputation as an underwriter, a bank may find itself unable to eliminate credit risk through 
securitization – meaning that the qualitative asset transformation process is incomplete. Credit 
risk inherent to the originated securities might actually return to the bank under the form of 
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informal off-balance-sheet commitments – as it spectacularly did to issuers of asset-backed 
securities in 2007 (Acharya et al., 2013). 
The second fundamental function of markets consists of enhancing liquidity. Exchange-
traded securities naturally tend to be more liquid than other assets in view of their 
standardized nature and of their access to a larger pool of potential buyers. Liquidity is one of 
the fundamental determinants of the attractiveness of securities (Amihud at al., 2005). 
However, liquidity can quickly evaporate in securities markets in the event of crises. As a 
result, the attractiveness of a financial asset is strongly increased by the presence of a lender 
of last resort (LLR) operating on the market for that specific asset. Through its commitment 
to lend on the asset at any moment at some price, the LLR provides a ceiling to transaction 
costs; in other words, the presence of a LLR acts as a guarantee against future liquidity 
shocks. Thus, assets covered by such a guarantee have a clear competitive advantage with 
respect to assets exposed to illiquidity risks, as they can be pledged to obtain credit at any 
moment. Central banks started enacting LLR policies in the mid-19
th
 century, but for many 
decades they limited their action to a rather narrow range of securities – mainly high-quality 
bills of exchange and a limited number of sovereign and quasi-sovereign bonds (Bignon et al., 
2012). This forced underwriters of corporate securities to step in: 19
th
-century banks saw as a 
positive duty the commitment to lend on the securities they had themselves issued (Flandreau 
& Sicsic, 2001). 
From what precedes, two insights can be drawn that are relevant for understanding 
corporate securities markets in the very early stages of industrialization. First, there are good 
reasons for underwriters to influence the price discovery mechanism – because profits can be 
made from price run-ups in the short run, and/or because reputation needs to be preserved in 
the long run. Thus, underwriting banks can be expected to actively implement market 
interventions in order to sustain the price and dividend performance of the underwritten 
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companies, both in the short and in the long run. Second, there are good reasons for 
underwriters to sustain the liquidity of underwritten securities – because liquidity is an 
essential determinant of asset prices. Thus, underwriting banks can be expected to provide 
market participants with lending of last resort facilities on the underwritten securities. On the 
whole, this means that underwriters can be expected to behave as market-makers for the 
securities they issue. These hypotheses will now be tested in the context of Belgium’s 
industrial take-off. 
 
4.2: Belgian Banks as Market Makers: Evidence 
The most popular measure of underpricing is the IPO discount – i.e., the difference 
between the issue price and the market price of the stock at the end of the first day of 
floatation. As data on IPO discounts are only available for four stocks (see Table 1), I 
compute an alternative measure of underpricing, which I call the mid-term price run-up: this 
is defined as the difference between the issue price and the mid-term equilibrium price of the 
stock (computed as the average price over the first six months in which the stock appears on 
bulletins). Table 7 compares mid-term price run-ups with actual IPO discounts for the only 
four stocks for which the latter are available. As expected, the two measures of underpricing 
differ, but they are of the same order of magnitude – except for one very special case.4 The 
computed mid-term price run-ups are shown in Figure 2. Three general patterns can be 
observed: on average, SG-affiliated stocks displayed the higher run-ups; BdB-affiliated stocks 
displayed lower run-ups; and non-affiliated stocks generally saw their price fall. For all 
classes, run-ups decline in the years following 1835.
5
 
 
                                                 
4
 The price of Asphaltes Seyssel stock experienced a spectacular rise during some weeks, rapidly lost 
momentum, and then disappeared completely from listings: this gives a very high average price that cannot be 
considered as an equilibrium price. 
5
 The conclusion does not seem to be valid for non-affiliated companies in 1838, but the result is entirely driven 
by the Asphaltes Seyssel stock (see footnote 4). 
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[Table 7 and Figure 2 about here] 
 
Were run-ups due to ex-ante underpricing (as in Rock, 1986) or to ex-post intervention 
(as in Ritter, 2011)? Direct historical evidence does not allow establishing if and to what 
extent underwriters intervened in the aftermarket in order to support the price of the securities 
they issued. One indirect way to answer this question consists of determining whether stocks 
were overpriced in the mid run by comparing prices and actual returns. Data on dividends are 
only available for ten stocks (see table 1),
6
 which are highly likely to suffer from the survivor 
bias – meaning that they supposedly cover only the high-quality end of the market. Past 
returns and prices for all assets on which information is available are displayed on Figure 3. 
Market prices appear to reflect the returns of the assets: the stocks whose price was higher 
actually paid higher dividends, and vice-versa; interestingly, the yield of corporate assets was 
more or less in line with the yield of Belgian government bonds. On the whole, no patently 
aberrant pricing of stocks can be found. This might be interpreted as pointing to the absence 
of a stock market bubble, and as suggesting that run-ups were due to ex-ante underpricing 
rather than to ex-post intervention by underwriters. 
 
[Figure 3 about here] 
 
Henceforth, the interpretation of underpricing as a ‘lemons premium’ necessary to attract 
outsiders to the securitization process does not seem to be disproved by prima facie evidence. 
However, the way the underwriting process was organized suggests that there was more to the 
story. As a matter of fact, initial subscribers were asked to pay only a small fraction of the 
                                                 
6
 Available data cover eight SG-affiliated companies, two BdB-affiliated companies, and no non-affiliated 
company. SG-affiliated companies include: SG Holding Company (financials), HF Couillet (ironworks), Hornu 
et Wasmes (coalmining), Levant du Flénu (coalmining), Produits au Flénu (coalmining), Sars-Longchamps 
(coalmining), Sclessin (ironworks), Manufacture de Glaces (glassworks). BdB-affiliated companies include: 
BdB Holding Company (financials), Actions Réunies (financials). 
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nominal capital, and instalment payments were then spread across a long time span. Price run-
ups thus provided a source of immediate gains for subscribers, who earned the difference 
between the issue price and the market price without having to put much capital on the table. 
In fact, the mechanism of allocation of new issues was very opaque. In the case of universal 
banks, bearers of affiliated securities were granted the right to subscribe new shares 
underwritten by the bank – which amounted to a sort of embedded call-option on future IPOs. 
But criteria for allocation were unclear, and insiders (typically, bank directors) managed to 
secure the lion’s share in the business (Chlepner, 1926, pp. 87-91). Thus, directors had a clear 
incentive to multiply new IPOs: this may perhaps explain why the number of incorporations 
skyrocketed in the space of a few months. This sort of rent was extracted by subscribers at the 
expense of the underwriter: for newly-issued shares held on its own account, the bank was 
thus paid less than the aftermarket price. In modern parlance, the underwriter was ‘spinning’ 
its own managers (Ritter, 2011). However, as directors had a clear incentive in maintaining 
the long-term viability of the mechanism and thus in not behaving as ‘wildcat bankers’, the 
rent was more akin to a tax than to a fully-fledged exploitation of the business by insiders. 
The impression that bank directors did not behave as ‘wildcats’ is corroborated once we 
look at the long-run performance of the issued securities. At the time of industrialization, 
stocks were spurious securities: as firms’ growth perspectives were highly uncertain, shares 
were often provided some enhancements, such as seniority over other liabilities or – more 
typically – a minimum dividend target (Baskin & Miranti, 1997). This is to be understood in 
the 19
th
-century context, in which dividends played as a substitute for income statement 
transparency and thus had a paramount signaling role (Van Overfelt et al., 2010). In 1830s 
Belgium, equities were generally attached a yearly minimum dividend target equal to 5% of 
the issue price. As missing this target was considered somewhat like a default, underwriters 
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that were keen on defending their reputation had an interest in avoiding the dividend 
underperformance of affiliated firms. 
Table 8 reports available data on the dividend performance of bank-affiliated firms until 
1848. Before the 1839 crisis, all companies largely beat the dividend target, thus conveying 
bullish signals to the stock market. During the economic depression of the 1840s, dividends 
declined for all firms – but according to different paths. On the one hand, all BdB-affiliated 
companies in the sample repeatedly missed the targets; on the other hand, only two out of the 
eight SG-affiliated companies in the sample did actually underperform. Such different paths 
might have been tied to the different strategies implemented by the two banks in the aftermath 
of the crisis. Following its bailout, in 1841 BdB was recapitalized by a group of new 
investors, who vowed to transform BdB into a pure commercial bank by liquidating its 
investment banking activities (Chlepner, 1926). As a result, the bank lost all incentives for 
defending its reputation as an originator of corporate securities, and consequently stopped 
performing subsidized lending to affiliated companies. Conversely, SG did not consider the 
opportunity of changing its business model, and therefore kept a strong interest in maintaining 
its reputational capital. The two SG-affiliated companies which repeatedly missed their 
targets in the 1840s (i.e. the Sclessin and Couillet ironworks) were among those more widely 
held by the bank herself (50.6% and 78.0% respectively), so that few investors were hit by the 
dividend cuts. Moreover, in order for the other SG-affiliated firms to avoid underperformance, 
the bank engaged into extensive subsidized lending and sponsored efficiency-enhancing 
company restructurings (Brion & Moreau, 1998). As long as they were willing not to quit the 
business, universal banks were thus ready to ‘make sacrifices’ in order for the present worth 
of their reputation not to drop – and this, even in a period of limited stock market activity as 
the 1840s (Ugolini, 2011). To sum up, while historical sources do not allow to find direct 
evidence of intervention by Belgian universal banks to sustain the price and dividend 
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performance of floated companies, many pieces of indirect evidence strongly suggest that 
(consistent with the first hypothesis) active intervention did actually occur in the short as in 
the long run – at least, as long as banks attached a positive value to their reputation as 
securitizers. 
 
[Table 8 about here] 
 
I now turn to the question of liquidity provision. Different measures of liquidity have 
been proposed (Goyenko et al., 2009). In the simplest form, liquidity is estimated by looking 
at bid-ask spreads (a proxy for transaction costs): the higher the transaction costs, the lower 
the liquidity of the asset. In the case of emerging markets, however, even reconstructing bid-
ask spreads is often an impossible task (Bekaert et al., 2007). This is also the case for 1830s 
Belgium. In order to overcome this problem, a viable alternative consists of focusing on non-
zero returns to equity (Lesmond et al., 1999). The idea is straightforward: lack of price 
movements over time is interpreted as evidence of illiquidity. Figure 4 shows the number of 
securities listed on the Brussels stock exchange displaying non-zero week-on-week returns. It 
is possible to observe increasing liquidity up to the first months of 1838, and then a collapse 
in the summer of the same year. One element emerges from the picture: securities issued by 
universal banks were relatively liquid, while non-affiliated ones were utterly illiquid. 
 
[Figure 4 about here] 
 
Was this due to the intervention of universal banks themselves? For both banks, available 
information on securities accepted as collateral covers one single date only – viz. the day they 
were obliged to disclose their books to inspectors in the event of their bailout: December 13, 
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1838 for BdB, and March 1, 1848 for SG (tables 9.1 and 9.2).
7
 It shows that universal banks 
almost exclusively lent on the securities they had underwritten themselves, while they only 
exceptionally took other securities (sovereign bonds included) as collateral. As confirmed by 
qualitative sources (Malou, 1863, p. 45), banks used to grant their affiliated securities 
eligibility for loans – i.e. they took the engagement of acting as LLR for them. Figures 5.1-2 
give the total sums lent on securities by SG and BdB during the boom-and-bust cycle. They 
clearly show that as time passed, banks became more and more involved in meeting the 
demand for such loans. In the case of SG (for which yearly averages are available), lending on 
securities peaked in 1839; while in the case of BdB (for which only end-of-year figures exist), 
lending on securities was declining at the end of 1838 – when the bank had already fallen 
victim to the run. As the speculative wave was losing momentum, more and more 
shareholders were bringing their securities to the banks in order to obtain cash. This means 
that borrowing conditions on the market were worse than those offered by banks. As a result, 
from being the lenders of last resort, banks ended up being the market-makers of last resort 
for affiliated securities, as the market simply ceased to exist outside the banks. This explains 
why, on the one hand, the observed liquidity of BdB-affiliated securities evaporated once the 
run prevented BdB from continuing to perform its lending policies; and why, on the other 
hand, the observed liquidity of SG-affiliated securities was not completely impaired by the 
crisis, as SG continued to lend up to the point of ‘absorbing’ the whole market.8 All this 
confirms the second hypothesis – viz., that banks offered lending facilities to market 
participants in order to sustain the performance of affiliated securities. On the whole, 
                                                 
7
 Although data for SG concern a much later date than the events analyzed here, we know that most loans had 
been contracted back in 1839 and systematically rolled-over thereafter (Annales Parlementaires, 1848). We can 
thus expect these figures to be representative of SG’s policy during the 1830s. 
8
 The effect of this ‘absorption’ of the market by the bank was the complete immobilization of the assets side of 
its balance sheet: although SG managed to avoid suspending payments in 1839, its structure became extremely 
fragile and could not survive the following liquidity crisis in 1848 (Annales Parlementaires, 1848). 
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historical evidence confirms that banks played a primary role in the functioning of emerging 
markets by acting as market-makers for the securities they had themselves originated. 
 
[Tables 9.1-2 and Figures 5.1-2 about here] 
 
 
Section 6: Conclusions 
 
Building on a substantial amount of primary and secondary qualitative and quantitative 
evidence, this article has provided detailed microeconomic evidence on the interaction 
between banks and markets in the early stages of the industrialization of a ‘moderately 
backward’ country. On the one hand, it has shown that Belgian banks played a substantial role 
in the creation of a stock market in Brussels in the 1830s. Before 1835, firms were rationed by 
the capital market and could only obtain funding from intermediaries (or the state). Banks 
acted as venture capitalists and arranged the conditions for the transformation of high-tech 
‘start-ups’ into exchange-listed public corporations. However, banks did not discharge all 
their stakes in floated companies and continued to monitor and control them. As a result, the 
stock market emerged not as a competitor to banks, but – quite to the contrary – as an 
instrument for banks to facilitate and expand their corporate finance business. On the other 
hand, the article has shown that Belgian banks played a considerable role not only in creating, 
but also in managing the Brussels stock market. First, banks created the conditions for price 
run-ups to happen – not only as a strategy for attracting outsiders to the stock market, but also 
as a way for securing profits to insiders. Second, banks continued to provide subsidization to 
affiliated firms after their floatation, so that the assets that they had taken out of their balance 
sheet through securitization actually reappeared on their balance sheet during the crisis. Third, 
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banks maintained the liquidity of issued securities by acting as lenders of last resort on them, 
and continued to provide liquidity to their holders during and after the stock market crisis of 
1839 – thus ending up ‘re-absorbing’ de facto most of the securitized assets. After having 
partially ‘externalized’ their corporate finance functions to the market in the 1830s, Belgian 
banks were therefore forced to ‘re-internalize’ most of them during the 1839 crisis. This was 
due to the fact that despite initial success, in the long term banks failed to attract enough 
outsiders to the new trading floor. However, the fact that the securitization wave of the 1830s 
was brutally stopped and put to a stand-by in the 1840s does not mean that the methods 
followed by banks were necessarily fundamentally unhealthy. As a matter of fact, the very 
same methods were applied anew by Belgian universal banks since the 1850s, and then met a 
considerable success in expanding the corporate securities market and thus establishing 
Brussels as one of the most important financial centres in Europe (Van Overfelt et al., 2009; 
Ugolini, 2011). 
These findings suggest that, in stark contrast to the traditional idea that markets are 
competitors to banks in the corporate finance sector, banks fostered the emergence of markets 
in order to facilitate and expand their own business. Markets and banks not only coexisted, 
but also coevolved: corporate assets were pushed out of intermediaries’ balance sheets 
through securitization, but they also jumped back to their balance sheets by means of their 
aftermarket interventions. All this is consistent with the conclusions of the theoretical 
literature on the coevolution of banks and markets (esp. Song & Thakor, 2010), but also 
qualifies them under one important respect. Following the traditional approach, the literature 
continues to consider changes in financial architecture as the result of modifications in 
structural (long-term) conditions. Although in an increasingly cautious way, also economic 
historians have continued to focus more on the structural economic, political, or legal factors 
impacting institutional design rather than on the contingent factors impacting the industrial 
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organization of finance (Fohlin, 2012, 2016). In this case study, intermediaries were found to 
alternatively ‘externalize’ and ‘internalize’ their corporate finance activities according to 
modifications not in structural, but in cyclical (short-term) conditions. Anecdotal evidence on 
the ‘formative’ phases of other national financial systems (1850s Germany, 1870s Austria, 
1890s Italy) appears to be consistent with these findings on 1830s Belgium. Therefore, one 
might speculate that, for all its importance, the role of path dependence in shaping financial 
systems might perhaps have been overemphasized by economists and historians alike. Only a 
more systematic comparative analysis of the early emergence of financial architecture across 
countries will be able to tell us to what extent this is may actually have been the case. 
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Tables 
 
 
 
Name of Series Number of Series 
Period of 
Coverage 
Source 
Market price of selected 
securities traded on the Brussels 
bourse (end-of-week) 
48 industrial stocks; 
2 government bonds 
1835-1839 Moniteur Belge; 
Journal du Commerce d’Anvers 
Number of securities traded on 
the Brussels bourse (end-of-
year) 
6 classes of securities 1834-1839 L’Indépendance Belge 
Sector of activity of joint-stock 
companies founded in Belgium 
and amount of capital raised 
151 companies 1831-1839 Briavoinne (1839) 
Names and affiliation of leading 
administrators in Belgian joint-
stock companies 
149 companies 1833-1838 Briavoinne (1839); 
Laureyssens (1975) 
IPO discounts on the Brussels 
bourse 
4 companies 1835-1838 Chlepner (1926); 
Brion and Moreau (1998) 
Dividends paid by companies 
listed on the Brussels bourse 
10 companies 1835-1848 SCOB database (University of 
Antwerp) 
Total amount of industrial 
securities held and total amount 
of loans on securities by 
Belgian banks (end-of-year) 
2 banks 1835-1842 Chlepner (1926) 
SG: Breakdown of corporate 
loans by region 
1 bank 1830-1839 De Troyer (1974) 
SG: Average amount lent on 
securities during the year 
1 bank 1835-1842 Malou (1863) 
SG: Breakdown of loans on 
securities by type of collateral 
1 bank, 1 date 1848 Annales Parlementaires 1848, 
CdR n° 251 (28th April 1848) 
BdB: Breakdown of loans on 
securities by type of collateral 
1 bank, 1 date 1838 Archives Générales du 
Royaume (Brussels), Fonds 
Min. Finances, 307/1/15, A 
Table 1: Summary of series and sources in author’s database. 
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Mons Brussels 
Rest of 
Belgium 
TOTAL 
1830 63.3 27.3 13.7 104.3 
1831 20.5 35.9 0.0 56.4 
1832 8.9 24.6 1.3 34.8 
1833 6.0 22.6 1.6 30.2 
1834 5.9 22.5 5.5 33.9 
1835 4.2 35.4 26.0 65.6 
1836 5.0 27.3 25.4 57.7 
1837 2.3 25.9 6.0 34.2 
1838 0.8 24.1 7.3 32.2 
1839 0.3 27.5 6.7 34.5 
Table 2: Geographic breakdown of total amounts of new short-term corporate lending (i.e. 
discount of trade bills) accorded by SG, 1830-9 (in million francs). Source: De Troyer (1974, 
p. 110). 
 
 
 
Banks and Investment Trusts 25.8% 
Coalmining 19.8% 
Steelworks 17.3% 
Insurance 4.3% 
Shipping 3.2% 
Real Estate Financials 2.9% 
Flax Mills 2.5% 
Printing 2.5% 
Glassworks 2.5% 
Sugar Refineries 2.3% 
Machinery 1.9% 
Other 15.0% 
TOTAL 100.0% 
Table 3: Breakdown per industrial sector of the total amount of capital raised, 1831-9. 
Source: Author, from Briavoinne (1839, pp. 224-6). 
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Number of 
Companies 
Founded  
Amount of 
Capital 
Raised  
Average 
Capital per 
Company 
SG-Affiliated Firms 31 
               
102.0  3.3 
BdB-Affiliated Firms 25 
                 
74.0  3.0 
Non-Affiliated Firms 95 113.0                 1.2 
TOTAL 151 
               
289.0  1.9 
Table 4: Breakdown per bank affiliation of the total number of incorporations, amount of 
capital raised, and average capital per company (in million francs), 1831-9. Source: Author, 
from Briavoinne (1839, pp. 223-4). 
 
 
 
 
 
Domestic 
Sovereign 
and 
Subsovereign 
Bonds 
Foreign 
Sovereign 
and 
Subsovereign 
Bonds 
Corporate 
Bonds 
Stocks 
of SG-
Affiliated 
Firms 
Stocks 
of BdB-
Affiliated 
Firms 
Stocks 
of Non-
Affiliated 
Firms TOTAL 
1834 4 13 0 1 0 0 18 
1835 3 12 0 4 2 0 21 
1836 4 10 0 19 9 4 46 
1837 4 10 0 21 14 9 58 
1838 5 9 0 21 17 8 60 
1839 5 9 0 21 17 8 60 
Table 5: Breakdown per asset class of the total number of securities traded at the Brussels 
stock exchange (end of year), 1834-9. Source: Author, from L’Indépendance Belge (1834-9). 
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Names of People Mentioned as ‘Leading Administrator’ of a Belgian 
Joint-Stock Company in Briavoinne (1839) 
Number of 
Companies 
Cumulative 
Capital of 
Companies 
(million 
francs) 
Charles de Brouckère (BdB) 13 55.3 
Ferdinand de Meeus (SG) 12 70.3 
« Gérants de la Société de Commerce » (leading adm.: F. de Meeus, SG) 7 17.2 
John Cockerill (BdB) 4 5.9 
« Gérants de la Société Nationale » (leading adm.: F. de Meeus, SG) 4 4.9 
9 other SG-related names (average) 1.9 4.6 
10 other BdB-related names (average) 1.6 3.9 
88 other names unrelated to SG or BdB (average) 1.1 1.0 
Table 6: Belgium, 1833-1838: Names of people mentioned as ‘leading administrator’ of a 
joint-stock company in Briavoinne’s treatise on Belgian industrialization, number of 
companies of which the person is a ‘leading administrator’, and cumulative capital of the 
companies of which the person is a ‘leading administrator’. Source: Briavoinne (1839, pp. 
562-6); Laureyssens (1975). 
 
 
 
 
Company Affiliati
on 
IPO Discount Mid-Term Performance 
Date Price Run-
Up 
Period Price Run-Up 
Société de Commerce SG Mar. 21, 1835 24% Jan.-Jul.1836 31.15% 
Sars-Longchamps SG Nov. 4, 1835 14% Jul.1836-Jan.1837 11.56% 
Raffinerie Nationale SG Jun. 19, 1836 12% Jan.-Jul. 1837 18.04% 
Asphaltes Seyssel None Feb. 10, 1838 10% Mar.-May 1838* 39.92%* 
Table 7: Brussels bourse, 1835-1838: IPO discounts and mid-term price run-ups of four 
selected stocks. Source: Chlepner (1926, p. 92); Brion and Moreau (1998, p. 62); author’s 
database. 
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SG BdB 
Excess Dividends with 
respect to the Target 
(% of the Stock’s Issue 
Price): Average 
Number of 
Companies 
in the 
Sample 
Of Which 
Missing the 
Target 
Excess Dividends with 
respect to the Target 
(% of the Stock’s Issue 
Price): Average 
Number of 
Companies 
in the 
Sample 
Of Which 
Missing the 
Target 
1835 0.95% 1 0 - 0 0 
1836 1.52% 4 0 1.10% 1 0 
1837 1.69% 7 0 2.80% 1 0 
1838 3.50% 8 0 2.39% 2 0 
1839 2.18% 8 0 0.00% 2 0 
1840 1.35% 8 1 0.00% 2 0 
1841 0.90% 8 1 0.00% 2 0 
1842 -0.10% 8 2 -1.75% 2 2 
1843 -0.20% 8 2 -1.43% 2 2 
1844 -0.36% 8 2 -1.63% 2 2 
1845 -0.04% 8 2 -2.08% 2 2 
1846 1.84% 8 1 -0.80% 2 2 
1847 1.26% 8 2 0.95% 2 0 
1848 1.30% 8 1 -0.50% 2 1 
Table 8: Dividend performance of bank-affiliated companies, 1835-48. Source: Author, from 
SCOB database. 
 
 
Own stock 16,95% 
Main 4 affiliated ‘financials’ 32,87% 
Main 3 affiliated ‘collieries and ironworks’ 11,27% 
Main 3 affiliated ‘other sectors’ 13,41% 
Undetermined 25,51% 
Table 9.1: SG, 1
st
 March 1848: Breakdown of total sums lent on securities (by classes of 
securities). Source: author’s computations on Annales Parlementaires (1848). 
 
 
Own stock 2,12% 
Listed affiliated ‘financials’ 24,68% 
Listed affiliated ‘collieries and ironworks’ 34,22% 
Listed affiliated ‘other sectors’ 9,74% 
Générale group stock 1,54% 
Listed non-affiliated stock 9,36% 
Unlisted stock 2,14% 
Sovereign bonds 16,19% 
Table 9.2: BdB, 13
th
 December 1838: Breakdown of total sums lent on securities (by classes 
of securities). Source: author’s computations on AGR Brussels, Fonds Min. Finances, 
307/1/15, A. 
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Figures 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Total number of joint-stock companies founded (right scale) and total underwritten 
capital (in million francs, right scale), 1831-9. Source: Briavoinne (1839, pp. 223-224). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Mid-term price run-ups (defined as the difference between issue price and the 
average market price during the first six months of presence on the bulletins), 1834-9. Source: 
author’s database. 
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Figure 3: Total dividend yields of a number of securities by affiliation, 1835-9. Source: 
author’s database; SCOB database. 
 
 
Figure 4: Number of companies with non-zero week-on-week return to equity (by affiliation), 
1836-9. Source: author’s database. 
 
 
Figures 5.1-2: Loans on securities and industrial portfolio by Belgian banks (end-of-year 
amount, in million francs), 1835-1842. Source: Malou (1863, pp. I-IV); Chlepner (1926, pp. 
78-79). SG, 1835-1842: Average amount lent on securities during the year (in million francs). 
Source: author’s computations on Malou (1863, p. XX) and Annales Parlementaires (1848). 
